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21. Introduction
The weak form of the efficient market hypothesis (henceforth EMH) claims that asset
prices fully reflect the information contained in the historical sequence of prices, so that
there are no investment strategies which yield abnormal profits on the basis of past
prices. Malkiel (1989) and Fama (1970, 1991) review the vast literature on tests of the
EMH. They both conclude that all in all there is strong evidence in favour of the weak
form of the efficient market hypothesis. The only serious threat to the EMH are some
seasonal patterns, like the January effect or the weekend effect, which are quite small, so
that they cannot be exploited if transaction costs must be paid.
By far the largest part of this literature concentrates on the analysis of univariate price
series, i.e. on whether future returns of a given asset can be forecasted by past prices of
the same asset. In the past twenty years, powerful multivariate time series methods have
been developed that allow to study whether future returns of one asset can be predicted
by past prices of a set of assets. One prominent multivariate concept is that of
cointegration. 
Consider two stock price series that can be described by a random walk individually.
The two stocks are called cointegrated if there exists a linear combination of the two
series that is not a random walk, but stationary. If two stocks are cointegrated, Granger's
representation theorem states that future returns of at least one of the two shares can be
predicted by past prices of both series (see e.g. Granger, 1987). Consequently, asset
prices from an informationally efficient market cannot be cointegrated1 and tests for
cointegration can be used to test the efficient market hypothesis.
Cointegration studies have been presented by Taylor & Tonks (1989) and Kasa
(1992) for international stock market data, by Cerchi & Havenner (1988) for American
and by Krämer (1997) for German stock market data. They all find evidence for
cointegration in their data. However, as there are thousands of assets available, this
evidence – especially when national stock markets are considered – may well be due to
data-mining or to the publication bias. The problem of data mining can be tackled by
considering only sets of stocks that share a common property, e.g. stocks that are issued
by the same company. This is the reason why this paper concentrates on cointegration of
voting and non-voting shares of the same company.
1 To be more precise, the EMH can only hold if the two stocks are either not cointegrated, i.e. any
linear combination of the two series is a random walk itself, or if they are "perfectly" cointegrated,
which means that there is a linear combination of the two stocks that is a constant.
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Motivated by Krämer's (1997) findings of evidence that the equilibrium error process
of two cointegrated stock price series is a long-memory process, the more general
framework of fractional cointegration is employed in this paper. Two random walks are
called fractionally cointegrated, if there exists a linear combination of the two series that
is not a random walk but a long memory-process. A long-memory process can be – but
need not be – stationary. It allows for wide and long-lasting deviations from equilibrium.
In the applied literature, fractional cointegration has already been used to model
purchasing power parity (Cheung & Lai, 1993), exchange rates (Baillie & Bollerslev,
1994) and interest rate futures (Booth & Tse, 1995).
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the main properties of German
voting and non-voting shares and briefly reviews the empirical literature on the price
difference between the two kinds of shares. In Section 3, the concept of fractional
cointegration is introduced, properties of fractionally cointegrated time series are
discussed and a test of the hypothesis "no cointegration" is presented. The data set is
introduced in Section 4, followed by the empirical analysis. It turns out that seven out of
ten considered pairs of voting and non-voting shares are fractionally cointegrated. In
Section 5, a simple trading strategy is introduced and analyzed; it leads to considerable
excess returns in two out-of-sample evaluations. Finally, the paper's main results are
summarized and discussed in Section 6.
2. Non-Voting Shares, Preferred Dividends and the Voting
Premium
German law requires that any share without a voting right must be vested with a
cumulative preferred dividend. This is a fixed nominal amount that must be paid annually
for each non-voting share before holders of the corresponding voting shares receive any
dividend. If the preferred dividend cannot be settled completely, next year's claim
increases by the unsettled amount. Further, if the preferred dividend is not paid in two
consecutive years, each non-voting share receives a voting right until the arrears are paid
fully.
Therefore, the total dividend is distributed among the two kinds of shares in the
following order: First, preferred dividends and arrears are settled. Then, for each voting
share an amount equal to the preferred dividend is payed. What remains is distributed
equally among all shares. Consequently, the dividend of a voting share never exceeds
4
that of a non-voting share. For some companies, the non-voting share's dividend always
exceeds the voting share's by an additional dividend yield. In case of liquidation, both
types of stocks are treated equally.
As most companies never issue more than one kind of non-voting shares, trades occur
frequently for voting and non-voting shares, so that complete time series data are
available for long periods.
Although a voting share's dividend never exceeds the corresponding non-voting
share's dividend, voting shares are usually traded at a higher price than non-voting
shares.2 This difference is called "voting premium". It is usually explained by indirect
benefits that can only be derived by the holders of voting shares or the majority of them.
There are several empirical studies of the voting premium: Lease, McConnell &
Mikkelson (1983) estimate the average relative voting premium for various US
companies whose different kinds of outstanding stocks solely differ in the number of
votes per share. Rydqvist (1996) does the same for Swedish stock market data and
regresses the relative voting premium on a variable that measures the competitiveness of
the company's ownership structure. A similar analysis is performed for the Italian stock
market by Zingales (1994), who includes the additional dividend yield of non-voting
shares as an independent variable in the regression. Kunz & Angel (1996) incorporate a
few more variables in the regression that measure transferability or liquidity of the
considered shares. They examine data from the Swiss stock market.
In all of these studies, the relative voting premium is assumed to be stationary around
a constant which is influenced by the company's or the stock's characteristics. This means
that the difference of the log prices between voting and non-voting shares is stationary. If
we assume that each individual log price series is a random walk as standard theory and
empirics suggest (see e.g. Fama, 1970), this implies that voting and non-voting share
prices are cointegrated. Consequently, the assumptions underlying the mentioned studies
imply that the considered capital markets are inefficient.
As most of these studies' results are robust, they might serve to indicate that voting
and non-voting shares are indeed cointegrated. However, this hypothesis has not been
tested rigorously before.
2 This observation would not be surprising if the two stocks corresponded to two (similar) companies.
Then, consistently higher dividends of stock 1 could (or even should) go along with a higher price of
stock 2. The point is that voting and non-voting stocks are shares of the same company. Preferred
dividends are paid from the company's resources that also belong to the holders of voting shares.
53. Fractional Cointegration: Modelling and Testing
Let V
t
and N
t
denote the prices of voting and non-voting shares at time t, respectively.
We assume that log prices v
t
= ln(V
t
) and n
t
= ln(N
t
) follow a random walk with
uncorrelated increments:
v
t
 = rv + v
t – 1 + ét
v
      and     n
t
 = rn + n
t – 1 + ét
n
, (1)
é
t
v and é
t
n are uncorrelated zero-mean error processes. Campbell, Lo & MacKinlay
(1997) discuss this model and its empirical relevance extensively. (1) implies that the
individual series of continuously compounded returns v
t
 – v
t–1 and nt – nt–1, respectively,
are uncorrelated and hence not predictable by past values. Consequently, (1) is consistent
with the efficient market hypothesis.
v
t
and n
t
are called fractionally cointegrated, if there are constants Ñ, Ò and Ó g IR,
such that n
t
 = Ñ + ÒEv
t
 + ÓEt + u
t
 (2)
and u
t
is a long memory or I(d) process with long memory parameter d g (0, 1).
Technically, this means that the spectral density of u
t
is unbounded at frequency zero and
behaves like Û–2d as Û → 0. u
t
is stationary if d < 0.5. For a thorough discussion of long
memory processes see Baillie (1996) or Granger & Joyeux (1980).
If the long memory parameter d is zero, the equilibrium error process u
t
is a short
memory process, like for instance an ARMA-process. In this case, n
t
and v
t
are classically
cointegrated. On the other hand, if d = 1, u
t
is integrated so that n
t
and v
t
are not
cointegrated. Therefore, the concept of fractional cointegration bridges the gap between
"no cointegration" and "classical cointegration", which become special cases of (2).
Equation (2) also captures the previous section's idea of a stationary voting premium,
if Ò = 1, Ó = 0 and u
t
is stationary. The term ÓEt in (2) has been included, because the
individual series have both a stochastic and a deterministic trend:
v
t
 = rvEt + v0 + é1
v
 + é2
v
 + ... + é
t
v
. (3)
 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
deterministic trend stochastic trend
The parameter Ó allows for the possibility that the cointegrating linear combination of
the two stochastic trends differs from that of the two deterministic trends. Moreover,
there is a technical reason for the inclusion of ÓEt in (2): It increases the power of the
Phillips-Perron test, which we introduce below.
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Properties of fractionally cointegrated systems
Granger (1986) deduces the error correction model of a fractionally cointegrated
system. It implies that future returns of at least one of the two series can be predicted by
today's equilibrium error u
t
and past returns of the two series. Hence, the efficient market
hypothesis requires that voting and non-voting share prices must not be fractionally
cointegrated.
Cheung & Lai (1993) show that an I(d)-process with d < 1 is mean-reverting, i.e. any
shock to the system eventually dies out. This means that equation (2) indeed specifies an
equilibrium, if u
t
is I(d) with d < 1. The deviations u
t
may be large and may persist over a
long time, but eventually the system will move back to the equilibrium. If for instance the
current error u
t
is positive, n
t
must decrease relative to v
t
in order to restore equilibrium
sometime. And so the voting share's return is likely to be larger than the non-voting
share's over the medium term. This is the intuition behind Granger's error correction
model.
Testing for fractional cointegration
Since we want to test the efficient market hypothesis, the null hypothesis is that v
t
and
n
t
 are not cointegrated, which means that u
t
 in (2) is I(1) for any Ñ, Ò or Ó
Tests of the hypothesis of no cointegration that are powerful against fractionally
cointegrated alternatives can be constructed in two different ways: One possibility is to
specify and estimate a fully parametric model, followed by an appropriate test for
fractional cointegration, as in Dueker & Startz (1997). The other way is to estimate the
potential cointegrating relationship by an OLS regression and to test the residuals for a
unit root with a semiparametric test, as in Cheung & Lai (1993) or Booth & Tse (1995).
The advantage of these semiparametric residual-based tests is that one needs to estimate
only those parameters that determine the long-run behaviour of the system. Since stock
market prices generally exhibit complex short-run characteristics – which would lead to a
complicated parametric model – we employ a residual-based test in this paper.
Depending on the unit root test that is applied to the OLS residuals, there are several
possible residual-based tests of the hypothesis of no cointegration. Dittmann (1998)
compares seven of these tests in an extensive Monte-Carlo study, which shows that the
Phillips-Perron t-test is more powerful against fractional alternatives than the Augmented
Dickey-Fuller test, the Modified Rescaled Range test and four variations of the Geweke-
Porter-Hudak test – including the tests used in Cheung & Lai (1993) and Booth & Tse
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(1995). For this reason, we apply the Phillips-Perron test in this paper.
In a first step, we estimate the following regression by OLS:
nt
Ñ ÒA= vt
ÓA t u
t
A
 (4)
In the second step, we apply the Phillips-Perron unit root test to the regression residuals
û
t
(see Hamilton (1994) for further details). This is a modified version of the OLS t-test
of the null hypothesis "á = 1" in the regression
û
t
 = á û
t – 1 + et . (5)
The test statisic is:
Zt
c
â
ps
2
q¢ £
=
á 1B
â á¢ £
1
2
B â
ps
2
q¢ £ cB¢ £
1
â
ps q¢ £
T 1B¢ £ â á¢ £
s  (6)
where c 1T 1B= 
e
t
2
t 2=
T
, â á¢ £ s2  u
2
t - 1
t 2=
T
F= , s2
1
T 2B
=  et
2
t 2=
T
 and

â
ps
2
q¢ £ is a consistent estimator of the long-run variance:
â
ps
2
q¢ £ 1
T
=  ej

e
T
B¢ £
2
j 1=
T
2
T
A  1
j
q
B¢ £
j 1=
q 1B
 e
 i

eT
B¢ £
i j 1A=
T
e
 i - j

eT
B¢ £. (7)
As proposed by Cheung & Lai (1997), the lag truncation parameter q is chosen by
Andrews' (1991) data-dependent formula, i.e. q is the greatest integer less than or equal
to kT with
kT
3T
2 =
1
3 2  r 
1  r 
2
B 
2
3
. (8)
 

 r  is the estimated first-order autocorrelation of ê
t
.
Dittmann (1998)  discovers that the  power  of this  Phillips-Perron  test  increases  in
large samples if Ó t is included in the cointegration regression (4) even if Ó is known to
be zero in (2). We use the critical values provided by Dittmann (1998), which do not
differ significantly from those given by Phillips & Ouliaris (1990).
84. Empirical Results for German Voting and Non-Voting Share
Prices
The data set
The available raw data consist of daily observations from 1974 to 1996 of all pairs of
voting and non-voting shares traded at the stock exchange in Frankfurt. Since missing
values due to holidays, weekends or no trading can distort the periodogram seriously
(see Dittmann, 1997), weekly observations are constructed by the following procedure:
First the series are adjusted for dividends, stock splits, etc. and all observations with no
or only low trading are discarded. Then for each individual series, weekly observations
are generated by selecting Wednesday's observation. If this observation is missing,
Tuesday's (then Thursday's, Monday's, Friday's) observation is used instead. The
advantage   of   mid-week   observations   is  that   only  few   German   holidays  fall  on
company,
main field of
activity3
number of
observations,
time period
preferred
dividend3
(DM)
extra
dividend3
(DM)
large
voting stock
holders3
Asko
retail trade
602
43/84 – 18/96
2.50 0.00 – 2.50 55% Metro
11% WestLB
11% BEGOHA
Babcock
engineering
1058
45/74 – 6/95
3.00 0.50 10% WestLB
Dyckerhoff
building materials
496
26/82 – 51/91
2.50 – 42% family property
15% Dresdner Bank
Herlitz
writing materials
436
52/87 – 18/96
1.92 0.64 60% family property
KSB
pumps, fittings
756
9/81 – 33/95
2.00 0.50 – 1.00 74% Klein Pumpen 
GmbH
Lufthansa
air traffic
1166
1/74 – 18/96
2.50 – 36% BRD
10% MGL
MAN
commercial vehicles
1099
16/75 – 18/96
2.00 – > 25% Regina
Rheinmetall
holding, engineering
601
44/84 – 18/96
3.00 1.00 67% Röchling
RWE
utilities
1166
1/74 – 18/96
2.50 – > 50% communities
WMF
kitchen utensils
426
44/81 – 51/89
3.00 – 28% Helvetic
17% Deutsche Bank
17% Münchner Rück
17% Württembg. AG
Table 1: Description of the companies and their stocks under consideration
3 Source: "Handbuch der deutschen Aktiengesellschaften", 1995/96, Verlag Hoppenstedt, Darmstadt.
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Wednesdays or Tuesdays and that the well-known anomalies at the end or beginning of
the week are circumvented. After merging voting and non-voting stock series, those ten
companies are selected that show the longest period of time without missing values in
either series.
Table 1 shows the ten accordingly selected companies, as well as the number and
period of observations used in the empirical analysis. The third column of Table 1
displays the cumulative preferred dividend, which is the minimum dividend that has to be
paid annually for each non-voting share. The fourth column shows the additional
dividend yield by which the non-voting share's dividend must exceed the voting share's
dividend. For 'Asko' and 'KSB', the additional dividend depends upon the dividend paid
for voting shares. Here, the range of the additional dividend is given.
Figure 1 shows voting and non-voting share prices of 'Lufthansa'. The two series stay
close together and clearly look cointegrated.
Testing the individual series for a unit root
Before testing whether there is a non-integrated linear combination of voting and non-
voting share prices, we have to make sure that the individual series are indeed integrated,
i.e. that equation (1) holds. For this reason, each of the twenty individual series is tested
for being a random walk against the alternative of being trend stationary. We conduct the
Phillips-Perron test and the Phillips-Perron t-test as described in Hamilton (1994) with
the lag truncation parameters 5, 10 and 20.
For both series of 'Babcock' as well as 'Rheinmetall' non-voting shares, the random
walk hypothesis is rejected at the 5% level by all tests. For 'Rheinmetall' voting shares,
four of the six tests reject. Since any linear combination of two trend stationary time
series is trend stationary as well, the concept of cointegration is not applicable for the
stocks of these two companies. Therefore, we exclude them from further analysis.  Note
Figure 1: Log-prices of 'Lufthansa' voting and non-voting shares
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that trend stationarity contradicts the efficient market hypothesis, too, since future
changes of a trend stationary time series can be predicted from past values of the series.
For 'Asko' voting shares as well as 'RWE' non-voting shares, the random walk
hypothesis is also rejected at the 5% level by most tests. For the associated series
however, all tests remain insignificant. Since cointegrating relation (2) can only hold if
both series are integrated or both series are (trend) stationary, we do not discard 'Asko'
or 'RWE'. Nevertheless, one must be cautious when interpreting the following results for
these two companies. In the remaining twelve series, the unit root tests do not find any
evidence against the random walk hypothesis (not even at the 10% significance level).
Evidence for cointegration
Table 2 displays the OLS estimates for cointegration regression (4), the Phillips-
Perron t-test statistic Z
t
as given in (6) and the corresponding p-values. Except for
'RWE', the Phillips-Perron t-test rejects the hypothesis of no cointegration clearly. Thus,
seven of our initial ten pairs of price series are indeed cointegrated.
cointegration regression estimates Phillips-Perron t-test
company Ñ Ò Ó Zt p-value
Asko - 1.13 1.11 0.00046 -5.976 1 %
Dyckerhoff - 0.21 1.01 - 0.00027 -5.010 1 %
Herlitz 0.36 0.84 0.00113 -4.096 2.5 %
KSB 0.47 0.87 0.00019 -9.197 1 %
Lufthansa - 0.09 0.98 0.00005 -4.470 1 %
MAN 0.42 0.88 0.00005 -8.319 1 %
RWE 0.26 0.80 0.00024 -3.762 7.5%
WMF - 0.33 1.05 - 0.00056 -4.529 1 %
Table 2: Estimates of the cointegrating equation and evidence for cointegration for eight pairs
of voting and non-voting shares.
Interpretation of the cointegration regression estimates
The idea of  a "voting premium" seems to be appropriate for 'Dyckerhoff', 'Lufthansa'
and 'WMF'. For these three companies, Ò is close to 1, so that the relative voting
premium becomes
Vt N tB
Vt
1 e
Ñ ÓA t
B= . (9)
As Ñ and Ó are negative for these three companies, relative voting premiums are
positive. The premium of 'Lufthansa' is roughly constant over time, whereas the
11
premiums of 'Dyckerhoff' and 'WMF' increase over time.
A more general interpretation of the estimates in Table 2 can be obtained by
considering equation (3) again. It states that the voting share's log price v
t
is the sum of a
stochastic trend, which is the source of risk, and a deterministic trend, which guarantees
an average positive return. Substituted into (2) we get:
n
t
 = Ñ + (ÒErv + Ó)Et + ÒE(v0 + é1v + é2v + ... + étv) + ut. (10)
If Ò is  smaller than one,  non-voting shares  bear less risk  than voting shares,  because
v0 + é1
v
 + é2
v
 + ... + é
t
v 
 is  the  only  source of  risk  for  both series.  This is the  case for
'Herlitz', 'KSB' and 'MAN'; for these companies Ò is around 0.86 and Ñ and Ó are
positive. Here, Ó being positive can be interpreted as a partial compensation for the
simultaneous reduction of average return, as ÒErv < rv. Size and sign of Ñ are irrelevant
if risk and average returns are considered. Adding the constant Ñ in (2) corresponds to
an adjustment of the non-voting share's  face value.
For 'Dyckerhoff',  'Lufthansa'  and  'WMF',  non-voting shares bear  approximately the
same risk as voting shares, because  Ò ≈1.  A peculiar case is  'Asko', whose  non-voting
shares bear more risk than voting shares ( Ò 1.11= ). This is rewarded by an extra
average return (Ó > 0).
The cointegration regression residuals
The results in Table 2 indicate that seven pairs of voting and non-voting shares are
cointegrated. Now we are going to examine the regression residuals in order to show
that these pairs are fractionally cointegrated. Figure 2 displays the residuals of
regression (4) for 'Lufthansa'.  This series rarely crosses the  horizontal axis  but  exhibits
Figure 2: Cointegration regression residuals for 'Lufthansa'
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Figures 3 and 4: Autocorrelations and log-periodogram of 'Lufthansa' cointegration regression
residuals
wide, long-lasting deviations from its mean. The empirical autocorrelations, shown
inFigure 3, decrease very slowly with increasing lags and the corresponding periodogram
in Figure 4 clearly has a pole at the origin. These figures therefore suggest that the
regression residuals of 'Lufthansa' have long memory.
Table 3 displays three Geweke & Porter-Hudak (1983) estimates of the long memory
parameter d* of regression residuals û
t
for each of the seven pairs of stocks. The
estimates are calculated from a periodogram regression which runs across the first Tn
smallest Fourier frequencies, where T is the number of observations and n is 0.5, 0.55
and 0.6, respectively. Except for 'Asko' and 'KSB', all estimates are larger than 0.5,
which implies that the estimated residual's process û
t
is not stationary. Cheung & Lai
(1993) and Dittmann (1998) present some evidence that the long memory parameter d*
of regression residuals û
t
is smaller than the long memory parameter d of the true but
unobservable residuals u
t
, because the OLS regression usually reduces too much variance
and thereby produces a 'bias towards stationarity'. So it might well be, that even 'Asko'
and 'KSB' have an instationary cointegration residual process u
t
.
GPH estimate of long memory parameter
company n = 0.5 n = 0.55 n = 0.6
Asko 0.47 0.45 0.59
Dyckerhoff 0.75 0.75 0.83
Herlitz 0.84 0.77 0.80
KSB 0.52 0.44 0.41
Lufthansa 0.77 0.84 0.85
MAN 0.61 0.55 0.57
WMF 0.68 0.62 0.67
Table 3: Estimates of the long memory parameter of the cointegration regression residuals for
seven pairs of voting and non-voting shares
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5. Trading Strategies and Excess Return
The previous section presented substantial evidence that seven out of ten pairs of
voting and non-voting stock price series are fractionally cointegrated. As cointegration
of asset prices constitutes a violation of the hypothesis of informationally efficient
markets, the question arises whether this anomaly is merely statistically significant or also
practically relevant. To this end, a trading strategy is proposed and evaluated in this
section.
Figure 5 shows the cointegration regression residuals û
t
for 'Lufthansa' together with
two horizontal lines at – 0.05 and 0.05. Consider the following trading strategy: 
1. Sell all voting shares and buy non-voting shares if û
t
 crosses the – 0.05 line.
2. Sell all non-voting shares and buy voting shares if û
t
 crosses the + 0.05 line.
If the cointegrating relation and this trading strategy had been known in advance, there
would have been seven portfolio changes during the observation period of 1166 weeks
(≈ 22.5 years). Each one of these changes yields an extra return of circa 10%, which has
to be added to the equilibrium return that realized in between.4 The corresponding
waiting times would have been between 60 and 260 weeks with an average of less than
three years. Certainly, this trading strategy would have been worthwhile even in the
presence of high trading costs.
Figure 5: Cointegration regression residuals for 'Lufthansa' with boundaries of the 10% trading
strategy
4 Since we consider log prices, u
t
= 0.05 means that non-voting shares are overpriced by
exp(u
t
) – 1 ≈ 5% at time t relative to the long-run equilibrium.
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Of course, this is only an ex-post evaluation, which consequently is biased toward
success. Unfortunately, an ex-ante evaluation is not possible anymore for most of the
considered pairs of voting and non-voting shares, because the available series have not
been divided into two parts in advance. Instead, the whole sample has been used for
testing, because fractional cointegration is a long-run phenomenon that therefore needs
long time series to be detected. Merely for 'WMF' and 'Dyckerhoff', an ex-ante
evaluation is still possible, as the corresponding series are divided into two parts due to
missing values.5 The second period of the available sample, which consists of 333 weeks
for 'WMF' and 227 weeks for 'Dyckerhoff', has not been used for the calculation of the
estimates and test statistics shown in Table 2.
Table 4 displays the total returns for four trading strategies over this second period.
Here, the strategy presented above is called the 10% strategy, because the distance
between the two trading thresholds is 0.1. The 5% strategy refers to the corresponding
rule with threshold levels – 0.025 and + 0.025. Further, the two bench mark strategies
'holding voting shares only' and 'holding non-voting shares only' are considered, too.
Table 4 shows that constant holding of 'WMF' non-voting shares from week 1/1990
until week 18/1996 results in a loss of 30.4% of the invested money, whereas the 5%
trading strategy leads to a gain of 31%, if there are no transaction costs. In the presence
of 1% transaction costs, that have to be paid for each of the 15 portfolio changes, the
5% strategy ends up with a gain of 12.7%, which still is an excess return of 43.1%
compared to the best standard strategy. For 'Dyckerhoff', the corresponding excess
return amounts to 64.6% in the absence of any costs and still 45.1% if 1% transaction
costs must be paid.
company strategy number of portfolio transaction costs 
changes 0% 1%
WMF 5% strategy 15 + 31.0% + 12.7%
10% strategy 9 – 0.7% – 9.3%
voting shares only 0 – 43.3% – 43.3%
non-voting shares only 0 – 30.4% – 30.4%
Dyckerhoff 5% strategy 14 + 48.8% + 29.3%
10% strategy 6 + 19.2% + 12.2%
voting shares only 0 – 15.8% – 15.8%
non-voting shares only 0 – 23.1% – 23.1%
Table 4: Total returns of four trading strategies for 'WMF' and 'Dyckerhoff' in the presence of
transaction costs.
5 The relevant missing values occur in the last week of 1989 (WMF) and the last week of 1991
(Dyckerhoff). Due to holidays, there were only two trading days in both weeks.
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6. Conclusions and Further Notes
Voting and non-voting shares of ten German companies have been analyzed for
fractional cointegration, using weekly observations over time periods between 7 and 22
years. The Phillips-Perron t-test, which we applied to the cointegration regression
residuals, provides strong evidence that seven pairs of these stocks are fractionally
cointegrated. The long-memory parameter estimates for the equilibrium error process
vary between 0.5 and 0.8, which implies that the equilibrium errors are not stationary.
Moreover, a potentially useful interpretation of the cointegration vector estimates in
terms of relative risk and return has been introduced. Thereby, the riskier of the two
cointegrated stocks can be identified easily.
For two pairs of voting and non-voting shares, the individual series are found to be
trend stationary, so that the concept of cointegration is not applicable. Yet, trend
stationarity contradicts the efficient market hypothesis, too. For only one pair of stocks,
the hypothesis of no cointegration cannot be rejected at the 5% significance level (but at
the 7.5% level).
In order to show that fractional cointegration of asset prices indeed violates the
efficient market hypothesis, a simple trading strategy has been proposed and evaluated
for two companies. For the evaluation, we used a second sample period that had not
been used for estimation. In both cases, the strategy leads to considerable excess returns
compared to permanent holding of only one kind of shares – even in the presence of
realistic trading costs.
This result should not hide the fact that fractional cointegration of asset prices cannot
be explained by trading costs in general. The reason is that it is possible to point out the
more promising asset of the two at any time, so that rational and informed individuals
will never buy the other one at the current price. The point is that someone who wants to
buy e.g. 'Lufthansa' stocks for whatever reason will never buy voting shares if it is known
that non-voting shares are more promising. So no extra trades are necessary in order to
invoke the market forces that restore equilibrium.
A related argument in favour of the efficient market hypothesis relies on high
information costs. Indeed, it is (at least initially) quite expensive to find out which asset
is the more promising one, so that it might be rational not to "buy" this information.
However, this argument can only explain very small deviations from efficiency, because
information costs are constant whereas expected profits from excess returns increase in
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the number of shares held. So for major stockholders or fund managers, relative
information costs are small.
A completely different argument, that might explain cointegrated asset prices in an
efficient market, is that the two considered stocks merely look cointegrated and that this
apparent cointegration is informationally efficient. The nature of this argument is best
clarified by a naïve example: Consider two companies that solely differ in their
probabilities of bankruptcy, which are public knowledge. The probability of bankruptcy
of company A is constant while that of company B varies over time around a constant. If
the stock market is informationally efficient, the two corresponding stock prices seem
cointegrated as long as no bankruptcy occurs. So in a model with varying risks, apparent
cointegration of stocks of two different companies can be informationally efficient.
However, this argument cannot explain cointegrated prices of two stocks issued by the
same company. If the company goes bankrupt, voting as well as non-voting shares are
equally worthless.
A closely related argument, which directly refers to voting and non-voting shares, is
based on the value of the voting right: Since a takeover premium is only paid for voting
shares, the difference between voting and non-voting share prices – the so-called voting
premium – should rise, if the probability of a takeover increases or if there is a rumour
about an imminent takeover (cf. Rydqvist, 1996). Consequently, periodically arising
rumours could cause apparent cointegration of voting and non-voting shares.
A more convincing argument for the German stock market, where serious takeover
contests are very unlikely (see Franks & Mayer, 1994, or Kojima, 1995), is given by
Zwiebel (1995). Zwiebel argues that benefits of control are divisible among a coalition of
shareholders, so that even holders of small blocks may extract a part of these benefits.
Therefore, a voting premium may exist even if takeover contests are impossible. Here,
the premium depends on the ownership distribution and the total benefits of control.
The nature of these corporate control arguments is static. They can explain why
voting shares are more expensive than non-voting shares at a given time, but they cannot
explain the dynamic phenomenon of cointegration. Certainly, one could reason that
quantities like ownership distribution or probability of takeover, that determine the
voting premium in these considerations, might fluctuate in a way that voting and non-
voting shares seem cointegrated. However, this consistently being the case (for seven
companies over up to 22 years !) investors can expect this regularity to persist and may
try to exploit it with a trading strategy like the one proposed in Section 5. If this is done
by many investors, market forces drive the system into equilibrium, so that in the end the
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voting premium is roughly constant over time.
To sum up it can be said that the presented evidence for fractional cointegration of
voting and non-voting shares seems to contradict the efficient market hypothesis even if
transaction costs, changing risks and corporate control arguments are taken into account.
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